Sunday, December 7, 2014

Supreme Court interprets Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

A three judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“SC”) comprising of Chief Justice H.L Dattu and Justice S.A Bobde and Justice A.M Sapre, his brothers on the bench, had the occasion to decide the below mentioned questions in reference titled as Hyder Consulting (UK) v. State of Orissa (copy avaialble here) decided on November 25, 2014:
Q.           Whether the decision of the SC in State of Haryana & Ors. v. S.L Arora and Company (“S.L Arora”) wherein it was held that an award of interest on interest from the date of award is not permissible under section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Act”) is good in law; and
Q.           Whether the arbitral tribunal is empowered to grant interest (both pre and post award), under the provisions of section 31(7), even in the absence of a clause to that effect in the contract, empowering the tribunal to do so.
Chief Justice H.L Dattu held that S.L Arora is good law in so much as where the arbitral award is silent about interest from the date of award till the date of payment, the person in whose favour the award has been made will be entitled to interest at the rate of 18 (eighteen) per cent per annum on the principal amount awarded, from the date of award till the date of payment.
However, Justice S.A Bobde and Justice A. M Sapre, through independent judgments, dissented with the above view and held that S.L Arora is wrongly decided in that it holds that the sum directed to be paid by the arbitral tribunal and the reference to the award on substantive claim does not refer to interest pendent lite awarded on the sum directed to be paid upon award and that in the absence of any provision of interest upon interest in the contract, the tribunal does not have the power to award interest upon interest, or compound interest either for pre award period or for the post award period and held that the arbitral tribunal is well empowered under section 31(7) to grant interest even in the absence of a clause in the contract to grant interest.
Relevant excerpts from the judgments are quoted below:
Justice S.A Bobde
It is apparent that vide Section 31(7) (a) of the Act, parliament intended that an award for payment of money may be inclusive of interest, and the sum of the principle amount plus interest may be directed to be paid by the Arbitral Tribunal for the pre-award period. Thereupon the Arbitral Tribunal directed interest to be paid on such sum for the post award period vide Section 31(7)(b) at which stage the amount would be the sum arrived at after the merging of interest with the principal; the two components having lost their separate identities
Justice A.M Sapre
I am inclined to hold that the amount awarded under Section 31(7)(a) of the act, whether with or without interest, constitutes a sum for which the award is made.” “Therefore, for the purposes of an award there is no distinction between a sum with interest, and a sum without interest. Once interest is included in the sum for which the award is made, the original sum and the interest component cannot be segregated and be seen independent of each other. The interest component then losses its character of interest and takes the color of the sum for which the award is made

Tuesday, April 22, 2014

Appropriation of Decretal Amount - Interpretation of Order XXI Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

The Supreme Court of India in V. Kalabharathi & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd (copy available here) decided on April 01, 2014 while deciding the question of appropriation of the decretal amount and discussing the Scope of Order XXI keeping in view the ratio of the constitution bench judgment in Gurpreet Singh v. UOI [2006 (8) SCC 457] have held as under:
"In money suit, the amount consists of principal and interest till the suit is filed. But, in case of award passed under the Act, the question of inclusion of any interest on the decretal amount does not arise".
"If the amount deposited by the judgment debtor falls short of the decretal amount, the decree-holder is entitled to apply the rule of appropriation by appropriating the amount first towards interest, then towards costs and subsequently towards principal amount due under the decree".
"After such appropriation, the decree-holder is entitled to interest only to the extent of unpaid - principal amount. Hence, interest be calculated on the unpaid principal amount".

Further the SC followed the principles laid down in Bharat Heavy Electrials Limited v. R.S. Avtar Singh & Co., [2013 (1) SCC 243], which discussed Gurpreet Singh's case as follows:

"The general rule of appropriation towards a decretal amount was that such an amount was to be adjusted strictly in accordance with the directions contained in the decree and in the absence of such directions, adjustment be made firstly towards payment of interest and costs and thereafter towards payment of the principle amount subject, of course, to any agreement between the parties".
"The legislative intent in enacting sub rules (4) and (5) is clear to the points that interest should cease to run on the deposit made by the judgment debtor and notice given or on the amount being tendered outside the Court in the manner provided in Order 21 Rule 1 sub clause (D)". 
"If the payment made by the judgment debtors falls short of the decretal amount, the decree holder will be entitled to apply the general rule of appropriation by appropriating the amount deposited towards the interest, then towards costs and finally towards the principal amount due under the decree". 
"Thereafter, no further interest would run on the sum appropriated towards the principal. In other words, if a part of the principal amount has been paid along with interest due thereon as on the date of issuance of notice of deposit of interest on the part of the principal sum will cease to run thereafter". 
"In case where there is a shortfall in deposit of the principal amount, the decree holder would be entitled to adjust interest and costs first and then balance towards the principal and beyond that the decree holder cannot seek to reopen the entire transaction and proceed to recalculate the interest on the whole of the principal amount and seek for re-appropriation thereof".

Also pertinent to note here is that the Privy Council in Venkatadri Appa Rao v. Parthasarathi Appa Rao [AIR 1922 PC 233] and Rai Bahadur Sethnemichand v. Seth Rada Kishen [AIR 1922 PC 26], held as follows:

“The question then remains as to how, apart from any specific appropriation, these sums ought to be dealt with. There is a debt due that carries interest. There are moneys that are received without a definite appropriation on the one side or on the other, and the rule which is well established in ordinary cases is that in those circumstances the money is first applied in payment of interest and then when that is satisfied in payment of the capital.”

Monday, April 21, 2014

SARFAESI - POWERS OF LESSEE OF A MORTGAGED PROPERTY

The Supreme Court of India, in the case titled as Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. & Ors. (copy available here) decided on April 03, 2014 - while dealing with the rights of the Lessee (remedies available where he is threatened to be dispossessed by any action taken by the secured creditor under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act) have held as under:

When a lessee becomes aware of the possession being taken by the secured creditor, he may either surrender the possession or resist the attempt of the secured creditor to take the possession of the secured asset by producing before the authorized officer proof that he was inducted as a lessee prior to the creation of mortgage or that he was a lessee in accordance with the provisions of Section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act and that the lease does not stand determined in accordance with Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act

Where the lessee resists the attempt of the secured creditor to take possession, the authorized officer cannot evict the lessee by force but has to file an application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act and state in the affidavit accompanying the application, the name and address of the person claiming to be the lessee.

When such an application is filed, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM) or the District Magistrate (DM) will have to give notice and give an opportunity of hearing to the person claiming to be lessee as well as the secured creditor, consistent with the principles of natural justice, and then take a decision.  

If the CMM or the DM is satisfied that there is a valid lease created before the mortgage or there is a valid lease created after the mortgage in accordance with the requirements of Section 65A of Transfer of Property Act and that lease has not been determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 111 of Transfer of Property Act, he cannot pass an order delivering possession of the secured secured assets to the secured creditor. But in case he comes to a conclusion that there is no valid lease made either before the creation of mortgage or after creation of the mortgage satisfying the requirements of Section 65A of Transfer of Property Act or even if there was a valid lease, the lease stands determined in accordance with Section 111 of Transfer of Property Act, he can pass an order for delivering possession of the secured asset to the secured creditor.

Section 14(3) of the SARFAESI Act provides that no act of the CMM or DM or any officer authorized by the CM or DM done in pursuance of Section 14 shall be called in question in any court or before any authority. The SARFAESI Act, therefore, attaches finality to the decision of the CMM or the DM and this decision cannot be challenged before any court or any authority. But this Court has repeatedly held that statutory provisions attaching finality to the decision of an authority excluding the power of any other authority or Court to examine such a decision will not be a bar for the High Court or this Court to exercise jurisdiction vested by the Constitution because a statutory provision cannot take away a power vested by the Constitution.

In our view, therefore, the decision of the CMM or the DM can be challenged before the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by any aggrieved party and if such a challenge is made, the High Court can examine the decision of the CMM or the DM, as the case may be, in accordance with the settled principles of law.

The High Court has failed to appreciate that the provisions of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act thus override the provisions of Section 69 or Section 69A of Transfer of Property Act, but does not override the provisions of Transfer of Property Act relating to the rights of the lessee under a lease created before receipt of a notice under sub section (2) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act by a borrower.

Hence if any of the appellants claim that they are entitled to possession of a secured asset for any term exceeding one year from the date of the lease made in his favour, he has to produce proof of execution of a registered instrument in his favour by the lessor. Where he does not produce proof of execution of a registered instrument in his favour and instead relies on an unregistered instrument or oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession, the CMM or the DM as the case may be, will have to come to the conclusion that he is not entitled to the possession of the secured asset for more than a year from the date of the instrument or from the date of delivery of possession in his favour by the landlord.

Saturday, April 19, 2014

CAG - Duties and Powers conferred by Article 149 of the Constitution of India

The Supreme Court of India, in the case of Association of Unified Teleservices Providers & Ors. v. Union of India (copy available here) decided on April 17, 2014 – while dealing with the scope and ambit of the powers and duties of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) in relation to the proper computation and quantification of Revenue in determining the license fee and spectrum charges payable to Union of India under Unified Access Services (UAS) Licenses entered into between DoT and the private service providers have held as under:

CAG’s examination of the accounts of the Service Providers in a Revenue Sharing Contract is extremely important to ascertain whether there is an unlawful gain to the Service Provider and an unlawful loss to the Union of India, because the revenue generated out of that has to be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India.

Accordingly, unless the underlying records which are in the exclusive custody of the Service Providers are examined, it would not be possible to ascertain whether the Union of India, as per the agreement, has received its full and complete share of Revenue, by way of license fee and spectrum charges.

Further the SC also observed that CAG by adopting that process, CAG is not carrying out any statutory audit of the accounts of the service providers, but for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether the Union is getting its legitimate share by way of “Revenue Sharing”. Service providers are, therefore, bound to provide all the records and documents called for by the CAG.

Monday, March 31, 2014

Scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

SAKUMA EXPORTS LIMITED V. LOUIS DREYFUS COMMODITIES SUISSE S.A.


INTRODUCTION

A bench comprising of Justice Shiva Kirti Singh and Justice Anil r. Dave of the Supreme Court of India (“SC”) while exercising Civil Appellate Jurisdiction and deciding the application and scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) have upheld the judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court and have held as under:  

“Where the parties have expressly chosen the proper law governing the contract, the chosen law must, in the absence of an unmistakable intention to the contrary, govern the arbitration agreement”. 


FACTS OF THE CASE

Appellant is an Indian Company, carrying on the business of import and export of sugar among other commodities – Respondent is a Swiss Company – The Appellant and the Respondent entered into an agreement dated January 12, 2010 for the purchase of 2700 metric tons of Brazilian white sugar of a stipulated description – Consignment was to be shipped between January 15, 2010 and February 15, 2010 at the option of the Respondent – The port of destination was to be Nhava Sheva or Kolkata at the option of the Appellant – Disputes arose between the parties which were submitted to Arbitration.


RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT

Terms and conditions: This Contract is subject to the Rules of the Refined Sugar Association, London as fully as if the same had been expressly inserted herein, whether or not either or both parties to it are Members of the Association.

The arbitration agreement: All disputes arising out of or in conjunction with this Contract shall be referred to the Refined Sugar Association, London for settlement in accordance with the Rules relating to Arbitration. This Contract shall be governed by and construed in accordance with English Law.

Paragraph 20 of Bombay High Court judgment reads as follows: In the present case, the parties have specifically made their contract subject to the rules of the Refined Sugar Association, London. Leaving no ambiguity of interpretation the contract mandates that the rules of the Refined Sugar Association, London are incorporated “as fully as if the same has been expressly inserted” in the contract. The governing law of the contract is English law. All disputes arising out or in conjunction with the contract were to be referred to the Refined Sugar Association for settlement in accordance with the rules relating to arbitration of the Association. The law in the U.K. is, therefore, the substantive law of the contract.  The seat of the arbitration is in the U.K. Parties have made it clear that the rules of the Refined Sugar Association would govern the resolution of their disputes.  Rule 8 of the Rules of the Refined Sugar Association (on which there is no dispute between the parties during the course of the hearing of the appeal) provides as follows:

Rule 8: For the purpose of all proceedings in arbitration, the contract shall be deemed to have been made in England, any correspondence in reference to the offer, the acceptance, the place of payment or otherwise, not-withstanding, and England shall be regarded as the place of performance. Disputes shall be settled according to the law of England wherever the domicile, residence or place of business of the parties to the contract may be or become. The seat of the Arbitration shall be England and all proceedings shall take place in England. It shall not be necessary for the award to state expressly the seat of the arbitration.

The terms of the contract as well as Rule 8 of the Rules of the Refined Sugar Association would make it clear that disputes shall be settled in accordance with the law of England wherever the domicile, residence or place of business of parties to the contract may be or become. Moreover, for the purposes of all proceedings in arbitration, the contract shall be deemed to have been made in England and England shall be regarded as the place of performance. The seat of the arbitration shall be England and all proceedings shall take place in England. On the basis of these provisions, it has been submitted that parties have, by the terms of their agreement, impliedly excluded the provisions of Part-I.  We find merit in the submission. It is clear from the terms and conditions which have been accepted by the parties in the purchase contract, read with Rule 8 that parties have accepted English law as the governing law of the contract; that the seat of the arbitration would be London; that disputes shall be settled according to the law of England which would include the resolution of disputes and that all proceedings shall take place in England. Alternatively, even if it were to be held that parties have not provided for the curial law governing the arbitration, the decision in Bhatia International does  not  prohibit the exclusion of the application of Part-I on account of  the proper law of the contract  being  a  foreign  law. Where the proper law governing the contract is expressly chosen by the parties, which they have done in the present case by selecting English law as the proper law of the contract, that law must, in the absence of an unmistakable intention to the contrary, govern the arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement, though it is collateral or ancillary to the main contract is nevertheless a part of the contract. In an application for challenging the validity of an arbitral award under Section 34, the Court would necessarily have to revert to the law governing the arbitration agreement which, in our considered  view, would be the law of England.”


CONTENTIONS

The petitioners sought to challenge, the final award as passed by the arbitral tribunal on December 31, 2010, under Section 34 of the Act.
The respondents questioned the maintainability of the said petition by arguing that the courts in India have no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The respondent most specifically raised the ground that the applicability of Part - I of the Act was excluded by the agreement between the parties and even under the law as it then prevailed in Bhatia International – a petition under Section 34 of the Act was not maintainable in the given circumstances.  


DECISION

The terms of the contract make it subject to the Rules of Refined Sugar Association, London by expressly inserting them in the contract. Rule 8 of the Refined Sugar Association, London, leaves no doubt that the parties have accepted English law as the governing law for the contract and have also submitted all disputes and arbitration to the law of England. Admittedly the seat of Arbitration is England. Thus, the courts in India have no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 34 of the Act.


SC ON APPLICATION OF PART – I OF THE ACT TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 

A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble SC in the case of Bharat Aluminum Company etc. vs. Kaiser Aluminum Technical Services Inc. etc. overruled the earlier judgment in Bhatia International and concluded that Part I of the Act would have no application to International Commercial Arbitration held outside India. The SC also directed that the law so declared shall apply only prospectively i.e. to all arbitration agreements executed thereafter.
Accordingly the arbitration agreement in the present case was to be governed in accordance with the law as decided in the case of Bhatia International. Thus the provisions of Part I of the Act were to apply to the International Commercial Arbitration held outside India unless the parties by an agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions.



Friday, February 7, 2014

Scope of Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Introduction


A Division Bench of the Supreme Court (“SC”) comprising of Justice A.K. Patnaik and Justice Ibrahim Kalifulla have ruled that the ongoing dispute between World Sport Group (Mauritius) Limited (“WSG”) and MSM Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Limited (“MSM”) will be decided by Arbitration proceedings to be held at Singapore. The SC while deciding so also set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court wherein the Bombay High Court had injucted (stopped) WSG from continuing arbitration proceedings against MSM.

Brief Facts 

The dispute relates to the grant of media rights for the Indian Premier League (“IPL”) by the Board of Control for Cricket in India (“BCCI”) to WSG and MSM.

MSM was granted media rights for IPL by BCCI in the Indian Sub-Continent and WSG was granted media rights for IPL by BCCI for the rest of the world.

Thereafter, WSG and MSM entered into an agreement, whereby MSM was to pay Rs. 425 Crores to WSG and acquire global rights to broadcast the IPL - The Agreement provided for a dispute resolution clause – “disputes would be resolved by arbitration by the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) to be held at Singapore”.

Thereafter Board of Cricket Control in India (“BCCI”) wrote to MSM stating that WSG had no role to play in the execution of the Contract and hence the facilitation fee of Rs. 425 Crores was to be paid to BCCI.

Thereafter MSM rescinded the Agreement on the ground that the agreement was voidable on grounds of misrepresentation and fraud by WSG.

Pursuant to the recession, WSG sought to invoke the arbitration clause in the Agreement and as a counter blast of WSG’s notice - MSM filed a suit in the High Court of Bombay for a declaration that the Agreement was voidable and that WSG was not entitled to invoke arbitration clause in the Agreement.

The Suit was dismissed by a single judge of the High Court of Bomaby but allowed in appeal by a Division Bench.

Thereafter WSG approached the Supreme Court against the Division Bench order.


Contentions


MSM had contended that WSG did not have any right to relinquish or to facilitate the procurement of Indian subcontinent media rights for the IPL from BCCI and no facilitation services could have been provided by WSG. Thus MSM claimed that the said representation by WSG which formed the basis for the Agreement was false and accordingly, the Deed was voidable at the option of MSM.

MSM further contented that the arbitration agreement was inoperative or incapable of being performed as allegations of fraud could be enquired into by the court and not by the arbitrator.

Decision


“This ground of challenge to the Facilitation Deed does not in any manner affect the arbitration agreement contained in Clause 9 of the Facilitation Deed, which is independent of and separate from the main Facilitation Deed and does not get rescinded as void by the letter dated 25.06.2010 of the respondent. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, therefore, could not have refused to refer the parties to arbitration on the ground that the arbitration agreement was also void along with the main agreement.”

On MSM’s contention that the arbitration agreement was inoperative or incapable of being performed as allegations of fraud could be enquired into by the court and not by the arbitrator, the Court held that,

“...the arbitration agreement does not become “inoperative or incapable of being performed” where allegations of fraud have to be inquired into and the court cannot refuse to refer the parties to arbitration as provided in Section 45 of the Act on the ground that allegations of fraud have been made by the party which can only be inquired into by the court and not by the arbitrator.”

Conclusion


The SC has very rightly held that a court in the context of a foreign arbitration would be obliged to refer parties to arbitration unless the arbitration agreement itself was found to be null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed as outlined in Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act). The decision is significant as it formulates precise guidelines based on which Indian Courts can refuse to refer parties to arbitration under Part II of the Act.

Note:    As the disqualifications in Section 45 were not satisfied in the present matter the Court held that the HC should not have interfered with the arbitration.

The dispute will now have to be submitted to ICC for arbitration to be held in Singapore.

Saturday, February 1, 2014

SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS SECTION 24 (2) OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION AND REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013

INTRODUCTION


A three judge bench comprising of Justice R.M. Lodha, Justice Madan B. Lokur, and Justice Kurian Joseph of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (hereafter referred to as “the SC”) while interpreting section 24(2) – (specifically true meaning of the expression “compensation has not been paid”) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereafter referred to as “the 2013 Act”) which came into effect on January 01, 2014 have held as under:

We are of the view, that for the purposes of Section 24(2), the compensation shall be regarded as “paid” if the compensation has been offered to the person interested and such compensation has been deposited in the court where reference under Section 18 can be made on happening of any of the contingencies contemplated under Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act. In other words, the compensation may be said to have been “paid” within the meaning of Section 24(2) when the Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in court and made that amount available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and 33.

BRIEF FACTS


The Municipal Commissioner, Pune (hereafter referred to as “the Commissioner”) Municipal Corporation (hereafter referred to as “PMC”) made a proposal on August 06, 2002 for acquisition of lands admeasuring 43.94 acres (hereafter referred to as “the said land”) for development of “Forest Garden”, the same was duly approved by the Standing Committee and thereafter sent to the Collector, Pune.

The Collector sanctioned the proposal and on February 20, 2003 and forwarded the same to Special Land Acquisition Officer, Pune for further action.

The notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereafter referred to as “the 1894 Act”) was published in the official gazette on September 30, 2004 and pursuant to the said publication, notices under Section 4(1) of the 1984 act were served upon the landowners / interested persons.

Thereafter the declaration under Section 6 of the 1984 act was published in the official gazette on December 26, 2005 and the same was also published at the site and on the notice board of the Office of Talaltti on February 02, 2006.

Following the notices under Section 9 of the 1984 act, the Special Land Acquisition Officer on January 31, 2008 made the award to acquire the land under Section 11 of the 1894 Act.

RELEVANT SECTIONS


Section 24 of the 2013 Act –


(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

(a) Where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or

(b) Where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.

      

      (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holding has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Section 31 of 1894 Act – Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court


(1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section.


(2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted:


There is amendment in Maharashtra – Nagpur City in Section 31 whereby in Sub Section (1) after the words compensation and in Sub Section (2), after the words, “the amount of compensation”, the words “and costs if any” have been inserted.

LEGAL ISSUES


Whether the said acquisition shall be deemed lapsed because the award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act is made more than five years earlier to the commencement of 2013 Act?

Whether it be said that deposit of the amount of compensation in the government treasury is equivalent to the amount of compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested?

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED


The landowners argued that by virtue of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the said acquisition shall be deemed to have been lapsed because the award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act is made more than five years prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and no compensation has been paid to the owners nor the amount of compensation has been deposited in the court by the Special Land Acquisition Officer.

PMC on the other hand argued that the award was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on January 31, 2008 strictly in terms of 1894 Act and on the very day the landowners were informed about the quantum of compensation for their respective lands.

Notices were also issued to the landowners to reach the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer and receive the amount of compensation and since they neither received the compensation nor made any request to make a reference to the District Court under Section 18, the compensation amounting to Rupees Twenty seven crores (INR. 27,00,00,000.00/-) was deposited in the government treasury.

PMC humbly submitted that there was no default on the part of the Special Land Acquisition Officer or the government and, hence, the acquisition proceedings have not lapsed.

Further PMC also relied upon Section 114 of the 2013 Act and it is argued that the concluded land acquisition proceedings are not at all affected by Section 24(2) and the only right that survives for the landowners is to receive the compensation.

ANALYSIS OF PAST PRECEDENT


Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor; [A.I.R. 1936 Privy Council 253(2)]


The Privy Council while discussing the powers of the state have held that it is settled proposition of law that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.

Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes and Others v. State of Goa and Another; [(2011) 11 SCC 506]


The SC while deciding the deposit of compensation by the state while relying upon the earlier decision in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corpn. of India Ltd.; [(1996) 2 SCC 71] has held that the deposit of the amount of compensation in the state’s revenue account is of no avail and the liability of the state to pay interest subsists till the amount has not been deposited in court.

DECISION OF THE COURT  



The SC while taking note of the admitted position that award was made on January 31, 2008 and notices to receive the compensation were issued to the landowners and upon their failure to receive the compensation, the amount of Rupees Twenty seven crores (INR. 27,00,00,000.00/-) was deposited in the government treasury observed that - "It is clear that the award pertaining to the subject land has been made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer more than five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It is also admitted position that compensation so awarded has neither been paid to the landowners / persons interested nor deposited in the court. The deposit of compensation amount in the government treasury is of no avail and cannot be held to be equivalent to compensation paid to the landowners / persons interested".

We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the subject land acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

CONCLUSION


The SC has once again come to the rescue of the common man by checking the abuse of power by the officers of the state and their failure to follow standard procedure as provided for under the relevant legislation. This decision by the SC will ensure that the state and its officers irresponsible conduct is taken into account and they be not allowed to reap windfall gains by circumventing or not strictly following the provided procedure.


Interpretation accorded to Section 24 of the 2013 act is welcome and will go a long way in standardizing the procedure / process relating to land acquisition in the country and also ensure that the procedure for acquisition of land as provided for in the 2013 act is rightfully followed both in letter and spirit.

Friday, January 10, 2014

ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL'S POWERS TO DIRECT PARTIES TO PLACE ON RECORD ASSESSMENT ORDERS UNDER SECTION 27 OF THE 1996 ACT

INTRODUCTION


The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (hereafter referred to as “the SC”) while dismissing the appeal in Delta Distillers Limited v. United Spirits Limited and another and discussing the scope of Section 27 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereafter referred to as “the act”) have held as under:

It cannot be ignored that the Arbitral Tribunal is required to make an award on the merits of the claim placed before it. For that purpose, if any evidence becomes necessary, the Tribunal ought to have the power to get the evidence, and it is for this purpose only that this enabling section has been provided.


BRIEF FACTS


United Spirits (hereafter referred to as “US”), a company which owns certain brands of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (hereafter referred to as “IMFL”) entered into an agreement dated March 25, 1997 (hereafter referred to as “the agreement”) with Delta Distillers (hereafter referred to as “DD”), a company carrying on the business of distilling and bottling of IMFL wherein DD agreed to manufacture and supply to US, IMFL of such brands and quantity, as would be specified from time to time.

Under the terms of the agreement, the contract price at which DD was to sell IMFL to US, was exclusive of sales tax and other taxes, and US was required to bear the same.

Sometimes in 2001-2002, certain disputes arose between the parties. One of the dispute being with regard to the outstanding amount payable at the foot of the running account between them.

US claimed that amongst others, amounts to the tune of Rupees One crore twenty two lacs thirty thousand six hundred and ninety two (INR. 1,22,30,692.00) and Rupees Seventy lacs twenty three thousand one hundred seven and fifty two paise  (INR. 70,23,107.52) were due and payable by DD to US, whereas DD maintained that an amount of Rupees Thirty nine lacs thirty seven thousand nine hundred and ninety three (INR. 39,37,993.00) was payable by US to DD.

US claimed that DD had obtained set-off / refund on the sales tax paid on packaging material from the Sales Tax Department, and such set-off / refund operated to reduce the sales tax liability of DD, which was ultimately being borne by the US.

US therefore, claimed that it was entitled to the benefit of the said set-off / refund, and accordingly debited DD for the amount of set-off/refund.

This dispute was referred to Arbitration and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.M. Rege was appointed as the sole arbitrator, who resigned as an arbitrator, and the proceedings continued before another arbitrator Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar.

US served a notice upon DD on March 17, 2007, calling upon DD to provide for inspection and to produce the following documents before the learned Arbitrator:
      a) All sales tax returns filed by the DD with the sales tax authorities for the assessment years 1995-1996 to 2001-2002;
      b) All sales tax assessment orders passed with regard to DD for the above-mentioned period, and all appellate orders, if any passed in any appellate proceedings arising out of the same;
      c) The objection, if any, filed by DD against the Notice in Form 40, and proposed order at pages 123 & 124 of Volume VI of the documents filed in the arbitration, the order, if any, passed thereon, and the appellate proceedings, if any, therein; and
      d) The letter dated May 26, 2000 mentioned in the letter at page 32 of Volume III of the documents filed in the arbitration.

Thereafter, DD vide their reply dated March 21, 2008, protested and objected to the production of these documents, since according to DD the same were being sought at a late stage when the proceeding had reached the stage of cross-examination of witnesses of US and thus US was not entitled to inspection of any documents at this belated stage.

Inasmuch as DD declined to give inspection / and produce the document as sought for, US made an application on March 26, 2007 before the learned Arbitrator, and in paragraph No. 5 thereof, sought a direction to produce the documents mentioned at Sl. Nos. (a) to (c) in the notice dated March 17, 2007.

The Ld. Arbitrator by her order dated March 27, 2007 allowed the application only to the extent of the assessment orders relating to the period 1995-1996 to 2001-2002 and the appellate orders mentioned in paragraph 5(b). The prayer for producing the sales tax returns mentioned in paragraph 5(a) was not entertained. Similarly, the prayer to produce the documents as sought in paragraph 5(c) was not entertained.
DD being dissatisfied with the order made certain allegations against the Ld. Arbitrator, who resigned from the said proceeding. The parties therefore, appointed an Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three Judges, Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. Jagannadha Rao (Presiding Arbitrator) and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.N. Variava, and Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.S. Rane.

On reconstitution of the Arbitral Tribunal US pointed out that the order passed by the earlier Arbitrator dated March 27, 2007 had not been complied with and the tribunal, called upon DD to state their position on an affidavit.

The Chairman of DD filed an affidavit before the Tribunal on September 16, 2011 stating that DD would not produce the sales tax assessment orders and specifically stated that the Sales Tax Returns are highly confidential and hence the same cannot be subject matter to be produced before this Hon'ble Tribunal especially when, sales tax set off is already quantified by the Claimants and the same is forming a part of their claim in the present arbitration proceedings.

In view of the affidavit of the Chairman of DD, the tribunal noted that DD though being in possession of the concerned documents was refusing to produce them, even after it had been directed to do so. Thus the tribunal by its order dated September 16, 2011 held that the earlier order dated March 27, 2007 passed by the previous arbitrator could not be reviewed by it as the tribunal did not have any jurisdiction to do so.

The Tribunal, therefore, permitted US to apply to the court under Section 27 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereafter referred to as “the act”) to seek production of the sales tax assessment order for the period 1995-1996 to 2001-2002, including any appellate orders in support thereof.

Pursuant to the permission granted by the Tribunal, US filed Arbitration Petition before the Single Judge of Bombay High Court invoking the powers of the Court under Section 27 of the Act of 1996, seeking a direction from the court ordering DD to produce the necessary assessment orders and appellate orders.

DD opposed the said Arbitration Petition by submitting that US’s demand pertains to records for the period 1995-1996 to 2001-02 and that the same were very old records and as such are not available with DD as they cannot be traced.

The Ld. Judge therefore, allowed the said petition invoking Section 27 of the Act of 1996, and directed DD herein to produce the documents sought for by US.

Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay DD preferred the present SLP.


LEGAL ISSUES


Whether the order which was sought by US against DD under Section 27 of the Act, was not within the competence of the court?

Whether the Arbitral Tribunal should have drawn an adverse inference against the DD under Order 11 and Rule 21 of Code of Civil Procedure for non-production of the documents, the production of which was sought by US?

Whether the documents which were being sought were confidential documents, and in view of the provision contained in Section 71 of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax 2002, and the order compelling the DD to produce such documents could not have been passed?


ARGUMENTS ADVANCED


DD contended that Section 27 of the 1996 act does provide for moving an application to seek the assistance of the court and as far as the appearance of a party in pursuance to a notice of arbitrator is concerned, there is a specific provision for proceeding in the event of default of a party under Section 25.

Further DD contended that the assessment orders were confidential documents, and Section 71 of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax, 2002 and its pre-cursor Section 64 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, did not permit production of these documents, and a direction as sought could not have been granted.

Further DD submitted that if the necessary documents are not produced, at the highest an adverse inference may be drawn against DD.


ANALYSIS OF PAST PRECEDENT


Union of India v. Bhatia Tanning Industries [AIR 1986 Delhi 195]


The Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi held that Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940 provides for service of notice by a party or arbitrator on a party before he proceeds to hear the case, and Section 43 permits the arbitrator to call a third person as well as a party as a witness, and the section was not confined only to calling third persons as witnesses.

Tulsiram Sanganaria and Anr. v. Srimati Anni Rai and Ors. [1971 (1) SCC 284]


A three Judges bench of the SC while interpreting Section 54(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 have held that the said provision created a bar on the production of the documents mentioned therein by the officials and other servants of the Income Tax Department, and made it obligatory on them to treat as confidential the records and documents mentioned therein, but the Assessee or his representative-in-interest could produce assessment orders as evidence, and such evidence was admissible.


DECISION OF THE COURT


The SC while taking note of the fact that, when UB first made an application for production of the assessment orders, the defense taken by DD in their affidavit dated September 16, 2011 was that those documents were confidential documents, and could not be directed to be produced. However, ten months thereafter, DD in their second affidavit filed in the High Court, contended that the said documents were not available have held as under:

The term 'any person' appearing under Section 27(2) (c) is wide enough to cover not merely the witnesses, but also the parties to the proceeding. It is undoubtedly clear that if a party fails to appear before the Arbitral Tribunal, the Tribunal can proceed ex-parte, as provided under Section 25(c).

At the same time, it cannot be ignored that the Tribunal is required to make an award on the merits of the claim placed before it. For that purpose, if any evidence becomes necessary, the Tribunal ought to have the power to get the evidence, and it is for this purpose only that this enabling section has been provided.

The quantification done by UB, in support of the claim, had been done on a theoretical basis and a hypothetical calculation should not be resorted to when actual Sales Tax Assessments are available, which would show as to whether the quantum of set-off allowed and claimed was in fact justified or not.


CONCLUSION


The SC by this decision has cleared muddied waters by dismissing the appeal filed by DD and upholding the judgment passed by the Hon’ble High Court at Bombay by categorically stating that if any evidence becomes necessary, the arbitral tribunal ought to have the power to get the evidence, and it is for this purpose only that this enabling section has been provided for in the 1996 act.

The SC while discussing the powers of the arbitral tribunal also highlighted that the arbitral tribunal may draw an adverse inference against one of the parties to arbitration if it feels that the party has failed to comply with or adhere to its order during the course of the Arbitral proceedings.

Most striking takeaway of this judgment remains that the SC has rightfully held that a party should not resort to a hypothetical calculation when actual documents establishing the claim are available with the other party, which would rightfully show whether the claim was justified or not.


Wednesday, January 8, 2014

2G CONTROVERSY - CANCELLATION OF LICENSES AND PRESENT STATUS WITH REFERENCE TO ARBITRATION

INTRODUCTION


The Supreme Court of India (“SC”) in Writ Petition (Civil) bearing number: 423/2010 and 10/2011 dealt with important question of law and after finding irregularities in the process of awarding of licenses by the Government of India (“GoI”) declared all licenses issued on or after January 10, 2008 to be illegal as the same were awarded in a wholly arbitrary and unconstitutional exercise of power. Thus the SC cancelled One hundred and twenty two (122) 2G telecom licenses derailing the business plans of both national and international companies with stakes in the Indian telecom sector.


As an aftermath of the decision, affected companies were seen mulling over remedial options, to safeguard and protect their investment in the once fancied telecom sector. The companies which picked up stake in Indian companies at a premium and thereafter made significant monetary contribution to roll out telecom services have put up a strong front and exercised several legal remedies available to fix accountability and claim damages for the losses suffered by them.


Telecom majors that were at the receiving end of the fiasco included the likes of – Unitech Group, Loop Telecom, Videocon Telecommunications, Swan Telecom, Idea Cellular, Spice Communications, S – Tel, Tata Teleservices and Shayam Telelink.


Foreign telecom majors that bought substantial stake in some of the Indian companies that were arbitrarily awarded the licenses are Sistema, Etisalat, Bahrain Telecommunications, Telenor, Khaitan Holdings Mauritius Limited.



BACKGROUND


The Department of Telecommunications (Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology), under the then telecoms Minister, Andimuthu Raja, allotted 122 2G mobile spectrum licences in 22 circles in the year 2008. The allocation was based on controversial "first come first served" criteria which led to allocation of the licenses at lower prices than would have been the case via an auction.


The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (“CAG”) highlighted various irregularities in the allotment process and estimated that the cost to the GoI in terms of loss of revenue realized from the spectrum sale / award was approximately 1.76 lakh crore.


THE JUDGMENT


The SC found the licensing process to be arbitrary and unconstitutional and thus cancelled all the 122 2G spectrum licenses in 22 circles allotted in the year 2008. The SC also took serious note of the grave irregularities like ineligibility of some of the winning bidders and collusion between officials and various industry executives. Further the SC was instrumental in asking TRAI to formulate fresh proposals on new licensing and spectrum allocation and asked the GoI to take a decision on the proposals, and auction the licenses within four months from the date of passage of the order.


IMPACT


1. Sistema, a Russian conglomerate which owns fifty six point eighty eight (56.88) percent stake in Sistema Shyam TeleServices (“SSTL”) issued a notice to the GoI under the India – Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”). The BIT binds signatories to provide investments with full protection and security and bars any expropriation of investment.


Sistema invoked Clause 9.1 of the BIT signed between the government of the Russian Federation and the Republic of India for the promotion and mutual protection of investments on December 23, 1994 which came into effect on August 4, 1996. This clause allows Sistema to initiate proceedings against GoI before an international arbitration tribunal set up in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, or any other forum, in case the dispute is not resolved within six months.


2. Telenor, an indirect majority shareholder in Unitech Wireless through its Singapore based subsidiary is in a legal dispute with its domestic JV partner, Unitech where Telenor has served a notice for indemnity and compensation upon the promoters of Unitech. In addition, Telenor is threatening to seek damages and compensation from the Government of India by invoking the provisions of the 2005 Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement between India and Singapore.


Telenor, which held a sixty seven point six (67.60) percent stake in Uninor, a joint venture (JV) with Unitech Limited, is keen to protect its investments in the country. On behalf of Telenor, the Norwegian government had intensified its diplomatic efforts to discuss various issues related to the 2G controversy and the possible way forward.


3. Etisalat which had a forty five (45) percent stake in Etisalat DB (earlier known as Swan Telecom), an Abu Dhabi based telecommunications company, has shut down its India network and has initiated proceedings against its Indian joint venture partners Swan Telecom and DB Group and its promoters Shahid Balwa and Vinod Goenka on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation.


Etisalat took a hit of USD 829 million in its Indian earnings after cancellation of the licences.


4. Bahrain Telecommunications (Batelco) which had bought forty two point seven (42.70) percent stake in S Tel Private Limited, in 2009, was the first to announce its exit plan from India.


Batelco reportedly sold the stake that it brought to its Indian partner (Siva Group), for Rupees Eight hundred and sixty crore (INR. 860,00,00,000.00/-) the very price it paid for purchasing the same.


5. Khaitan Holdings Mauritius Limited (“KHML”) that holds twenty six point ninety five (26.95) percent stake in Loop Telecom has slapped a USD 1.4 billion notice on the Indian government, seeking international arbitration while arguing that the South Asian nation was not able to protect investments made in the mobile phone operator since 2008.


According to the arbitration notice Mauritius registered Khaitan Holdings Mauritius Ltd (KHML) has invoked the India Mauritius Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPA) treaty and has intimated the ministries of communications, finance and external affairs of treaty violations.


KHML has demanded that the government appoints an arbitrator within two months and has offered to keep London or Dubai International Finance Centre as the seat of arbitration.


6. Japan's DoCoMo, which holds twenty six (26) percent stake in Tata Teleservices has filed a review petition, since their license application was filed in 2006 and the government was supposed to process it within thirty (30) days instead of clubbing it with applications processed in January 2008.


7. Malaysia's Axiata which holds around twenty (20) percent stake in Idea Cellular has filed a similar review petition in the SC as Idea Cellular had also filed its license applications in 2006.



CURRENT POSITION


There can be no predicting the outcome of these court cases. So far, SSTL and Telenor are the only two companies that plan to continue operations in India post the cancellation of their licences. Meanwhile, TRAI has done a commendable job to outline a future course of action to bring in transparency in the sector to promote investments in the once booed sector.


Sistema has secured CDMA spectrum in eight circles including Delhi, Kolkata, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh (West) and West Bengal telecom for Rupees Three thousand six hundred thirty nine and forty eight crore (INR. 3,639.48 crore) in the auctions held in March 2013. It also has a license in the Rajasthan circle which was not affected by the Supreme Court judgment last year.


Further mobile operator Telewings have got unified license in the six circles of UP East, UP West, Bihar and Jharkhand, Maharashtra and Goa, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, after its promoter Telenor successfully transferred assets of old venture Unitech Wireless to the new entity.



WAY FORWARD


Learning from the past, India has introduced provisions in the just concluded bilateral investment protection and promotion agreement (“BIPPA”) with the United Arab Emirates to ensure that only executive decisions can be challenged and that too within a stipulated period.


This comes in the wake of Vodafone threatening to use India's BIPPA with the Netherlands to challenge the tax levied on the acquisition of an Indian business through a retrospectively applied change in the law, besides other disputes raised by overseas investors seeking recompense through the respective country treaties.


The inclusions in the UAE treaty will protect the Indian government from international arbitration challenges in the event of Parliament changing the law or judicial pronouncements having to be implemented.